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50 BOARD OF EDUCATION V. MINOR 
Bob Jones University v. United States 
461 U.S. 574 (1983) 
Governmental antidiscrimination objectives 
and religious liberty concerns were pitted 
against each other in Bob Jones University v. 
United States, a 1983 U.S. Supreme Court de-
cision holding that educational organizations 
eligible for federal tax-exempt status may not 
discriminate on the basis of race. In addition 
to recognizing this antidiscrimination require-
ment, the Court rejected Bob Jones 
University's claim that racially discriminatory 
practices rooted in religious belief should be 
exempted from Internal Revenue Service an-
tidiscrimination regulations. In the context of 
the Court's earlier decision in United States v. 
Lee (1982) and subsequent decisions such as 
Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices, et al. v. Roy (1986), Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), 
and Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), 
the Supreme Court's refusal to grant a special 
exception from a generally applicable eligibil-
ity scheme to a religious organization was to 
be expected. What made the Bob Jones 
University decision especially noteworthy was 
the political firestorm that surrounded the de-
cision, thanks to Reagan administration ef-
forts to moot the Bob Jones University 
litigation by rescinding the IRS's antidiscrimi-
nation requirement. 
Bob Jones University calls itself " the 
world's most unusual university." Although 
unaffiliated with any established church, the 
university is dedicated to the teaching and 
propagation of fundamentalist religious be-
liefs. In pursuit of these goals the university 
dictates strict rules of conduct for its students. 
To enforce one such rule forbidding interra-
cial dating and marriage, the university denies 
admission to applicants engaged in or known 
to advocate interracial dating and marriage. 
The Bob Jones University controversy 
began in November 1970, when the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in 
Green v. Kennedy (D.C., 1970) enjoined the 
IRS from according tax-exempt status to 
racially discriminatory private schools in 
Mississippi. The Green court suggested that 
the IRS would not be permitted to grant tax-
exempt status to institutions that violate the 
government's public policy of nondiscrimina-
tion. The IRS then reversed its position of 
granting tax exemptions to racially discrimina-
tory institutions and notified the university 
that it intended to challenge the tax-exempt 
status of private schools that maintain racially 
discriminatory admissions policies. In re-
sponse, the university in 1971 sought to enjoin 
the IRS from revoking its tax-exempt status. 
That suit culminated in Bob Jones University 
v. Simon, a 1974 Supreme Court decision that 
"prohibited the University from obtaining ju-
dicial review by way of injunctive action be-
fore the assessment or collection of any tax." 
The IRS in January 1976 formally re-
voked the university's tax exemption. After 
paying a portion of the federal unemployment 
taxes due, the university filed suit for a refund, 
contending that it was statutorily and consti-
tutionally entitled to reinstatement of its tax 
exemption. In April 1981 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the re-
vocation of the exemption. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Bob Jones 
University and in Goldsboro Christian 
Schools, Inc. v. United States, cases presenting 
identical issues. On January 8, 1982, the 
Justice Department petitioned the Court to 
vacate these cases as moot in light of the 
Reagan administration's decision to reinstate 
the tax-exempt status of racially discrimina-
tory private schools. Because of a related 
court order that prevented the administration 
from reinstating the tax-exempt status, how-
ever, the administration withdrew its request 
that the Court declare the cases moot. On 
May 24, 1983, the Supreme Court, by a vote 
of 8 to 1, denied tax exemptions to the two 
petitioner schools. In its decision the Court 
made certain general pronouncements, both 
on the meaning of the Internal Revenue 
Code's exemption provision and on the IRS's 
authority to issue rulings in accordance with 
its own interpretation of the code. The major-
ity, in an opinion written by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, held that a tax-exempt institu-
tion must confer some "public benefit" and 
that its purpose must not be at odds with the 
"common community conscience." The Court 
further held that the IRS has broad authority 
to interpret the code and to issue rulings based 
on its interpretation. 
The Court also considered the religious 
liberty claims of Bob Jones University and 
Goldsboro Christian Schools. Noting that the 
"Government has a fundamental overriding 
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in 
education," the Court concluded that this 
governmental interest "substantially out-
weighs whatever burden denial of tax bene-
fits" places on the exercise of religious belief. 
By holding that equality of treatment on the 
basis of race is the Constitution's most essen-
tial protection, and that the government's 
broad interest in racial discrimination in edu-
cation was at issue, the Court had little diffi-
culty in disposing of the religious liberty 
claims of Bob Jones University and Goldsboro 
Christian Schools. In fact, the Court devoted 
only three pages of its thirty-page opinion to 
the religious liberty issue. 
The Court, however, overstated the gov-
ernment interest as it applied to Bob Jones 
University. Racial discrimination in education 
(or public support of such discrimination) was 
not the precise government interest at issue. 
More accurately, the government interest is a 
much more limited one, focusing on discrimi-
natory policies applied by a religious school 
for religious reasons. Moreover, unlike 
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Bob Jones 
University admitted both minority and non-
minority students. 
The Court's failure to treat Bob Jones 
University'S religious liberty claim seriously or 
to distinguish the religious liberty interests of 
the two schools can probably be attributed 
to the justices' efforts to make Bob Jones 
University a case of great symbolic value. 
Although the case initially was perceived as a 
religious liberty lawsuit, the Reagan policy shift 
transformed it into a socially significant racial 
discrimination lawsuit. Indeed, although several 
religious groups (including the American 
Baptist Churches, United Presbyterian Church, 
and National Association of Evangelicals) sup-
ported Bob Jones University's religious liberty 
claim, the vast majority of amicus curiae fil-
ings-sometimes joined by religious interests 
such as the American Jewish Committee-were 
by civil rights organizations that strenuously 
opposed Bob Jones University. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Court may have thought it best 
to keep the focus of the case narrow and to 
make the language about the evils of racial dis-
crimination universal. 
The Court should not be faulted too 
much for this interpretation. Between nondis-
crimination in education and religiously 
inspired discrimination, the Court's endorse-
ment of nondiscriminatory objectives is 
hardly surprising. To give substantial atten-
tion to religious liberty concerns would-by 
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making the case appear more complex-
indirectly limit the forcefulness of the Court's 
embrace of equal educational opportunity. 
In other words, the Court seemed to recog-
nize the political impact of the decision and 
thus spoke in general terms about the mean-
ing of the tax-exemption provision of the 
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